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Abstract
The use of RFID technology in complex and distributed environments often leads to a multi-
domain RFID system, in which trust establishment among entities from heterogeneous
domains without past interaction or prior agreed policy, is a challenge. The current trust
management mechanisms in the literature do not meet the specific requirements in multi-
domain RFID systems. Therefore, this paper analyzes the special challenges on trust man-
agement in multi-domain RFID systems, and identifies the implications and the require-
ments of the challenges on the solutions to the trust management of multi-domain RFID
systems. A multi-domain trust management model is proposed, which provides a hierarchi-
cal trust management framework include a diversity of trust evaluation and establishment
approaches. The simulation results and analysis show that the proposed method has excel-
lent ability to deal with the trust relationships, better security, and higher accuracy rate.
Introduction
The term Internet of Things (IoT) arises from the need to establish heterogeneous environ-
ments where the devices with varying processing capabilities can cooperate and communicate
in an intelligent environment transparently to the user [1]. In its background and current
research of IoT section, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is considered as a
foundational technology for IoT. RFID has been widely used in many and diverse areas, such
as logistics, pharmaceutical production, retailing and supply chain management [2]. The use
of RFID technology in complex and distributed environments often leads to a multi-domain
RFID system in which security issues such as authentication of tags and readers, granting
access to data, and revocation of readers turn into an administrative challenge. A common sce-
nario is eEnabled airplanes scenario [3], where on-board RFID tags and readers will be con-
nected to different ground systems across multiple management domains, for logistics and
access control. The part maintenance history contained in on-board RFID tags is the airline’s
proprietary information and the access should be protected against random or intentional
access from illegal RFID readers of other management domains.
Many cryptographic authentication and data protection techniques have been proposed
to solve the security issues in the literature [4–8]. Although conventional cryptographic
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124 July 14, 2017 1 / 23
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPENACCESS
Citation: Wu X, Li F (2017) A multi-domain trust
management model for supporting RFID
applications of IoT. PLoS ONE 12(7): e0181124.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124
Editor: Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, University of
Texas at San Antonio, UNITED STATES
Received: April 13, 2017
Accepted: June 26, 2017
Published: July 14, 2017
Copyright: © 2017 Wu, Li. This is an open access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author and
source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: The minial data set of
wsn simulation is within the supporting
information.
Funding: The work in this paper has been
supported by National Natural Science Foundation
of China (Program No. 71501156) and China
Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Program
No.2014M560796). http://www.nsfc.gov.cn/,
http://jj.chinapostdoctor.org.cn/V1/Program3/
Default.aspx.
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
mechanisms can provide data confidentiality, data integrity and node authentication for
exchanged messages and protect the system from external attacks, they fail to deal with insider
attackers [9]. For example a reader owning legitimate cryptographic keys can easily launch an
internal attack inside the system by altering data or injecting bogus information without being
identified. So we need to introduce trust management into IoT RFID system.
Trust management is a mechanism that also allows identifying malicious, selfish, and com-
promised nodes. Trust computation model and trust management systems have been imple-
mented successfully in commercial applications. There is also a rapidly growing literature
around topics of trust and reputation management for IoT [10, 11]. Devices in the IoT may be
equipped with inexpensive low-performance microcontrollers that provide just enough com-
puting power to periodically perform their intended tasks, i.e. obtain sensor readings and com-
municate with other nodes. The problem of trustworthiness and trust management of low-
power low performance computing nodes has been discussed in previous research, in particu-
lar in the context of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [12]. Importantly, most techniques
proposed in this field focus on building trust relationship between nodes of the same domain
based on observing the communication behavior of these nodes. The current trust manage-
ment mechanisms in the literature do not meet all requirements for a functional implementa-
tion for the IoT context.
In the multi-domain RFID paradigm, a mobile tag will potentially interact with numerous
readers from different management domains for a coalition, as well as leverage available (for-
eign) infrastructure for information access while on the move. However, trust establishment
among entities from heterogeneous domains without past interaction or prior agreed policy, is
a challenge. We analyze the special challenges on trust management in the multi-domain
RFID system, when compared to conventional RFID system in IoT environments, and identify
the implications and the requirements of the challenges on the solutions to the trust manage-
ment of multi-domain RFID systems.
Heterogeneity of management domains: Two different management domains, who want
to establish a coalition, may carry their own policies for authentication and authorization.
They need to negotiate for permitting access to each other’s RFID tags. The trust management
of multi-domain RFID systems is required to provide a flexible and configurable trust model,
enable readers and authentication centers of different domains to negotiate and collaborate.
Diverse trust requirements: There exists multi-type entities include RFID tags, RFID read-
ers and authentication centers in the multi-domain RFID systems. These entities have diverse
trust requirements due to the different of their number, capability and stability. The trust man-
agement of multi-domain RFID systems has to be providing a diversity of trust evaluation
approaches to accommodate potentially a diversity of trust requirements.
Support of multiple applications: There is a wealth of potential RFID applications such as
object identification, any subsequent tracking and record management. Each application has
its unique requirements on implementation. However, a generic trust module underlying all
the RFID application will be ideal as it increases reusability & scalability. A trust management
solution is preferred to be adaptive to the diverse applications.
Large scale Systems: With the advances in IoT technologies, the number of nodes available
in multi-domain RFID systems will be enormous. Thus, the trust management solution needs
to be scalable. The trust management approaches are required to include efficient algorithms
in terms of computation, communication and/or storage for trust evaluation and establish-
ment, so to handle access requests and information exchange from a potentially large number
of collaborative entities.
Based on the specific requirements in multi-domain RFID systems, this paper focuses on
the critical trust management issues and proposes a multi-domain trust management model.
A multi-domain trust management model
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The proposed trust management model provides a hierarchical trust management framework.
The main contributions of our system are:
1. A hierarchical trust model including RFID reader trust layer and authentication center
trust layer is proposed by us, which provides a diversity of trust evaluation and establish-
ment approaches to accommodate heterogeneous management domains and diverse trust
requirements.
2. The D-S theory is introduced to compute the trustworthiness of readers. To make the D-S
theory fit into multi-domain RFID systems; we creatively define three interaction events
and nine event assumptions, which is adaptive to the multiple applications.
3. Another trust evaluation method of reader is proposed based on verification of interaction
proof. The proposed method verifies the authorization use of a reader by saving its interac-
tion proof in the tag. Only saving the recent interaction feedback record in the tag is suit-
able for limited built-in memory tag.
4. A centralized trust evaluation scheme is proposed to evaluate the trustworthiness of authen-
tication centers. An administration center is in charge of managing the trust of authentica-
tion center based on the abnormal event reports of readers of its own domain. Using more
abnormal event reports helps trust convergence more quickly. Therefore our scheme can
deal with large scale RFID applications.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. In Section 3, the pro-
posed trust management method is discussed. Section 4 describes the test scenario and simula-
tion results. Finally, we conclude with a summary of our results and directions for new
research in Section 5.
Related work
Trust management in IoT environments
In the literature, there is a rapidly growing literature around topics of trust and reputation
management for IoT [11]. Several trust management systems have been proposed for RFID
systems in IoT environments. Basically, trust management is the mechanisms to evaluate,
establish, maintain, and revoke the trust between devices of the same or different networks
within the IoT environment. The trust computation techniques in [13] are classified on four
design dimensions: trust composition, trust propagation, trust aggregation and trust update.
The authors summarize advantages and drawbacks of each dimension’s options, and highlight
the effectiveness of defense mechanisms against malicious attacks.
The work in [14] proposes an IoT protocol framework for RFID-based devices—the Scal-
able RFID Security Framework and Protocol Supporting IoT (SRSFPSI). The proposal entails
an effective ID procedure founded on a hybrid framework (group-based and collaborative
technique) and highly adaptive security monitoring handoff for RFID IoT networks. The pro-
tocol offers adaptability and scalability while upholding secure and adaptable RFID net-works.
Other than preventing the introduction of malicious nodes and facilitating scalability, the pro-
tocol is integrated with a malware recognition tool.
In [15], the authors propose a lightweight and robust trust establishment scheme. The
proposed trust scheme is lightweight thanks to a simple trust estimation method. The com-
prehensiveness and flexibility of the proposed trust estimation scheme make it robust against
different types of attack and misbehavior. But evaluation results show one drawback of
the proposed scheme is that it is sensitive to false-positive alarms, compared to other trust
mechanisms.
A multi-domain trust management model
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The work in [16] presents a trust management scheme based on revised Dempster-Shafer
(D-S) evidence theory. D-S theory is preponderant in tackling both random and subjective
uncertainty in the trust mechanism. A trust propagation mechanism including conditional
trust transitivity and dynamic recommendation aggregation is developed for obtaining the rec-
ommended trust values from third part nodes. Our proposed scheme is inspired by [16], but
we use the different Dempster rules in our mole. In addition, the shortcomings of D-S evi-
dence theory based trust scheme are analyzed in our paper.
The work in [17] proposes a computational model for the trust management. In order to
enhance the security of data sharing and access control, the trust evaluation is built into the pro-
cess of transactions of the data exchange and authorization. An example shows the performance
of the proposed computational trust model. In [18], the authors investigate the personalized
applications and services of IoT by detecting people-object gestures with a passive RFID tag.
The proposal is analyzed based on people-object gestures classification. In [19], the authors also
present a hierarchical trust model for the Internet of Things, similar to our work. Though the
simulation results show the benefit of hierarchical trust model, the proposed model doesn’t
explain the details about how to calculate the trust of reader. Our work is different with [19].
The trust relationship is classed into three classes: intra-domain trust, inter-domain trust and
cross-domain, and time window mechanism is introduced in our multi-domain trust manage-
ment model.
In [20], the authors evaluate the existing approaches to trust management in the Internet of
Things based on three parameters. The first parameter focuses on trust management protocol
in IoT, the second parameter concerns scalable solutions for trust management in IoT, and the
third parameter addresses context-aware assessment in IoT. The paper has given a compara-
tive evaluation of each existing approach for trust modeling in IoT, based on these parameters.
Finally, the authors consider that the further research into trust management in IoT is required
to develop scalable and context-aware trust solutions in IoT networks.
All these trust management schemes do not focus on the trust issue of multi-domain RFID
systems. Designing a suitable trust management model to evaluate the trust of entities from
heterogeneous domains without past interaction or prior agreed policy, is a challenge. In the
paper, we analyze the special challenges on trust management in multi-domain RFID systems,
and identify four trust requirements for multi-domain RFID systems. Finally, a hierarchical
trust management framework is proposed to build the trust relationships among entities from
heterogeneous domains.
D-S evidence theory
In 1976, Shafer published a book named A Mathematical Theory of Evidence [21]. Dempster-
Shafer Theory has a wide range of application on uncertainty reasoning, decision analysis and
predication. Evidence theory is based on belief function and plausible reasoning [22].
First of all, we define Θ as a frame of discernment {T, ¬T} as the set of propositions under
consideration where T and ¬T mean that the given agent considers a given correspondent to
be trustworthy or not to be trustworthy, respectively. The sign 2Θ indicates the set composed
of all the subset generated by the frame of discernment. For a hypothesis set, denoted by A, m
(A)![0,1]
mð⊘Þ ¼ 0
X
A22Y
mðAÞ ¼ 1
Ø is the sign of an empty set. The function m is the basic belief assignment.
A multi-domain trust management model
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Dempster’s rule of combination combines two independent evidences.
mð⊘Þ ¼ 0
(
mðAÞ ¼
1
1   K
X
B\C¼A
m1ðBÞm2ðCÞ
K ¼
X
B\C¼⊘
m1ðBÞm2ðCÞ
Dempster’s rule of more than two evidences: Suppose there are m evidences that are inde-
pendent.
fmðAÞ ¼ ðm1ðA1Þ m2ðA2Þ  . . .Þ mpðApÞ
mðÞ ¼ 0
(
The basic probability assignments are m1,m2,. . ..mp. The focal elements are A1,A2,. . ..,Ap. m
(A) is a basic probability assignment which describes the combined evidence.
The trust evaluation strategy of readers in section 3.2 is proposed based on the D-S evidence
theory in our paper.
Proposed trust management model
Our work will focus on the authentication and a measure of trust between RFID tags and read-
ers by using a hierarchical trust model, which regulates the authentication process based on
the trustworthiness of entities. In the section, we express the details of the proposed trust man-
agement model.
System model
Our RFID system model consists of one or more domains which in turn include four types of
entities: RFID tags, RFID readers, authentication centers and an administration center (see
Fig 1). In addition, RFID readers are also named as nodes. It is similar with the model in [23].
The RFID tag located on the object to be identified is the data carrier in the RFID system. The
RFID reader is be able to interact with a tag include both reading data from and writing data
to a tag. Every domain has an authentication center. The authentication center authorizes a
reader of its own domain or other domain to interact with a tag of its own domain, and utilizes
the data obtained from the tag in some useful manner. An administration center manages and
maintains the trust of authentication centers.
In particular, a tag Tk and a reader Rj belong to an administrative domain A which is con-
trolled by an authentication center CA-which in the following is referred to as home domain.
While a tag is typically attached to an object that may roam to other administrative domains,
also referred to as visited domains, a reader will always remain in its home domain only. Fur-
thermore, we assume that a reader is always connected to its home authentication center via a
secure channel. Also, an authentication center is always connected to the administration center
via a secure channel, while the communication between tags and readers is insecure.
In the paper, we class the trust relationship in a multi-domain RFID system into three cate-
gories (marked with red color in Fig 1) based on trust domain boundaries: 1) Intra-domain
trust refers to the trust relationship between tags and the readers of the domain. 2) Inter-domain
trust is a kind of trust relationship which is set up by the authentication centers in the system
levels. 3) Cross-domain trust means the trust relationship between tags and the readers of differ-
ent domains.
A multi-domain trust management model
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A hierarchical trust management framework shown in Fig 2 is proposed to build the trust
relationships among entities from heterogeneous domains. We assume that RFID tag is pro-
tected and trusted. Thus, we only focus on evaluating the trustworthiness of RFID reader and
authentication center. We refer to two layers of trust in the framework: RFID reader trust layer
and authentication center trust layer.
Fig 1. Our RFID system model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g001
A multi-domain trust management model
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In RFID reader trust layer: We propose two kinds of scheme to evaluate the trust of read-
ers: D-S evidence theory based scheme (D-S scheme) and verification of interaction proof
based scheme (VIP scheme). Section 3.2 and 3.3 represent the details of evaluating the trust-
worthiness of RFID reader.
In authentication center trust layer: An administration center is used to manage the trust-
worthiness of authentication centers in a centralized way. The trust of an authentication center
is eventually obtained by aggregating the abnormal event reports of all readers of its own
domain. The system model section describes how to management and evaluate the trust of
authentication center.
Trust evaluation of RFID readers based on D-S evidence theory
In our trust model, the formation of an opinion about trustworthiness of a RFID reader
depends on its interaction behaviors with other entities. Every node is implemented a watch-
dog agent that detects the interaction behaviors of neighbor nodes [24]. Table 1 shows three
kinds of interaction events observed by neighbor nodes.
In order to adapt easily to multiple application scenarios, nine assumptions of interaction
behavior are defined. The behavior of reader is divided into three levels: malicious reader, nor-
mal reader, malfunctioning reader. Let Rj denotes the neighbor node of reader Ri. Let Tloji ðtkÞ
denotes the local trust of Ri that is evaluated by its neighbor node Rj in time window tk. Here,
we introduce time window mechanism, and the main objective of the timing window is to
record recent records and forget previous records [25]. The time window in Fig 3 consists of
three time units (L = 3).
Fig 2. Hierarchical trust management framework.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g002
A multi-domain trust management model
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Table 1. Different interaction behaviors of a reader.
Event type Assumptions of interaction behavior Behavior type mark
Discarding data (orders) Not discarding data (orders) normal A0
discarding data (orders) due to not connect to neighbors malfunctioning A1
Intentionally discarding data (orders) malicious A2
Tampering with data (orders) Not modifying data (orders) normal A3
Not modifying data (orders), but network transmission error malfunctioning A4
Intentionally modifying data (orders) malicious A5
Replaying or forging data (orders) Not replaying or forging data (orders) normal A6
Not replaying or forging data (orders), but network transmission error malfunctioning A7
Intentionally replaying or forging data (orders) malicious A8
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.t001
Fig 3. Example of time window mechanism in D-S scheme.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g003
A multi-domain trust management model
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In time window tk, neighbor node Rj records the number of interaction behavior of Ri, and
uses them to compute Tlo
ji
ðtkÞ as follows:
Nji ¼
nA0 þ nA3 þ nA6
nall
ð1Þ
Mji ¼
nA2 þ nA5 þ nA8
nall
ð2Þ
Fji ¼
nA1 þ nA4 þ nA7
nall
ð3Þ
Tlo
ji
ðtkÞ ¼ ðNji;Mji; FjiÞ ð4Þ
where:
nA0 ::::nA8 : the number of interaction behavior A0. . .A8;
nall: the total number of all interaction behavior;
Nji: the reader Ri’ local trust value of normal behavior calculated by Rj in tk;
Mji: the reader Ri’ local trust value of malicious behavior calculated by Rj in tk;
Fji: the reader Ri’ local trust value of malfunctioning behavior calculated by Rj in tk;
The proposed algorithm of computing Tlo
ji
ðtkÞ is described in the following Fig 4.
As the example in Fig 3 shows, after each Δ period, the time window slides to the right,
recording recent interaction behavior information and forgetting information recorded ear-
lier. The time window in Fig 3 consists of three time units (L = 3), and nA0 ::::nA8 are the num-
ber of interaction behavior A0. . .A8, respectively, of reader Ri observed by its neighbor node Rj
in time window tk.
Fig 4. Algorithm of computing the local trust of reader.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g004
A multi-domain trust management model
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Every node maintains two tables: local malicious node table (LMT) and local malfunction-
ing node table (LFT). In Fig 4, ϑ2 < Nji−Mji< ϑ1. ϑ1, ϑ2 and π1 is the trust threshold value. In
order to prevent the malicious behavior, a high value is given to ϑ1 and ϑ2. π1 is used to evaluate
the malfunctioning status of reader. In our simulation experiments, the value of ϑ1, ϑ2 and π1
are 0.7, 0.5, 0.3, respectively. After every Δ period, the time window slides to the right, record-
ing recent information and forgetting information recorded earlier.
The interaction events of a RFID reader can be observed by other neighbor nodes except
neighbor node Rj. We can get a global trust value of RFID reader by efficiently integrating the
local trust opinions calculated by all neighbor nodes in time window tk. However, the local
trust opinions of neighbors have strong subjectivity and uncertainty. Evidence theory pro-
posed by Dempster and Shafer can briefly express the important conceptions, such as ‘uncer-
tainty’ or ‘not-knowing’. Based on the Dempster knowledge rule in section 2.2, the global trust
value of reader Ri is eventually obtained as follows:
Ni ¼ N1i  N2i  N3i:::: Nji ð5Þ
Mi ¼ M1i M2i M3i::::Mji ð6Þ
Fi ¼ F1i  F2i  F3i:::: Fji ð7Þ
Tgl
i
ðtkÞ ¼ ðNi;Mi; FiÞ ð8Þ
where:
N1i. . ..Nji: the reader Ri’ local trust value of normal behavior calculated by neighbor node
R1. . ...Rj in tk, respectively;
M1i. . ..Mji: the reader Ri’ local trust value of malicious behavior calculated by neighbor node
R1. . ...Rj in tk, respectively;
F1i. . ..Fji: the reader Ri’ local trust value of malfunctioning behavior calculated by neighbor
node R1. . ...Rj in tk, respectively;
Ni: the reader Ri’ global trust value of normal behavior in tk;
Mi: the reader Ri’ global trust value of malicious behavior in tk;
Fi: the reader Ri’ global trust value of malfunctioning behavior in tk;
The proposed algorithm of computing Tgl
i
ðtkÞ is described in the following Fig 5.
The global trust of reader Ri is calculated by its authentication center. In addition, the global
trust value of reader Ri is stored in its authentication center.
In the end, the trust computing process of reader Ri based on D-S scheme is summarized as
four steps: 1) The interaction event of reader Ri is detected by its neighbors; 2) The neighbor
nodes of reader Ri calculate the local trust of Ri by using a time window mechanism and send
the local trust value to the authentication center; 3) The authentication center of reader Ri cal-
culates the global trust of Ri by synthesizing these local trust opinions based on the Dempster
knowledge rule; 4) If the reader Ri is a malicious or malfunctioning node, the authentication
center sends the abnormal event report to administration center.
A multi-domain trust management model
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Trust evaluation of reader based on verification of interaction proof
The pre-condition to use D-S based trust evaluation scheme is that the interaction events can
be monitored by neighbor nodes. However, the events sometimes may not be monitored by
neighbors due to the limited communication range in RFID systems. In addition, the sparse
distributed readers also lead to the low monitoring efficiency. Therefore, we propose another
trust evaluation method of reader based on verification of interaction proof (VIP scheme) in
the section. We assume the following scenario:
Ri and Rj are denoted as the readers. Let CA and CB to denote the authentication center of Ri
and Rj. Ti is denoted as a tag and its authentication center is CB. At time t, a reader Ri wants to
interact with the tag Ti.
The process of pre-authorizing is described in the following.
1. Reader Ri finds Tag Ti, and sends the interaction request to Ti, then Ti responds the request
and sends the information about its number, name of its home domain, etc., to the Ri.
2. After Ri receives the response information, it sends the authorization request to the authen-
tication center of Ti. The authentication center of Ti makes the interaction decision based
on the trust of Ri.
3. If the authorization is approved, the authentication center of Ti sends the authorization cer-
tificate to Ri. Then, Reader Ri shows the authorization certificate to Ti and finishes the inter-
action at time t. Finally, Ti saves the interaction feedback record (Ri,t,Si). Si expresses
feedback score. Tag Ti rates 1 if it is satisfied with the interaction and 0 otherwise.
4. At next time t’, tag Ti interacts with Reader Rj. Ti adds the interaction feedback record (Ri,t,
Si) to the data packet D, and delete the record in its own memory.
5. Then D is changed as M, where M = (cert’,rnt’,seq,Ri,t,Si,h) and h = hash(cert’,rnt’,seq,Ri,t,Si). h is
hash function which ensures the integrity of M. cert’ is the certificate of Ti. rnt’ is random num-
ber of Ti. seq is sequence number of D. Ti forwards M to Rj. Rj adds ðcerRj ; rnRj ; h0Þ to M. M is
changed as M’. M 0 ¼ ðcert0 ; rnt0 ; seq;Ri; t; Si; cerRj ; rnRj ; h0Þ and h0 ¼ hashðcerRj ; rnRj ; hÞ.
cerRj and rnRj is the certificate and sequence number of Rj, respectively. M’ contains the sign
of Rj.
Fig 5. Algorithm of computing the global trust of reader.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g005
A multi-domain trust management model
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6. Rj forwards M’ to an intermediate reader, which will check h and h’. If the checking fails,
the intermediate reader will refuse to forward M’, otherwise forwards M’ to the authentica-
tion center CB of reader Rj.
7. After the authentication center CB receives M’, it will check whether there is an abnormal
event of misusing the authorization or not at time t based on the feedback score. If the feed-
back score is 0, the authentication center CB of reader Rj will send the abnormal event
report to authentication center CA of reader Ri and administration center, respectively.
Here, we also introduce the time window mechanism. Fig 6 shows the example of time win-
dow mechanism in VIP scheme.
In time window tk, the authentication center of reader Rj records the number of interaction
behavior of Ri, and uses them to compute the global trust value Tgli ðtkÞ of reader Ri as follows:
Tgl
i
ðtkÞ ¼ 1 
ns
nall
ð9Þ
where:
ns: the interaction number of score being 0 of reader Ri in time window tk;
nall: the all interaction number of reader Ri in time window tk;
Tgl
i
ðtkÞ: the global trust value of reader Ri.
The time window in Fig 6 consists of three time units (L = 3), and ns and nall are the interac-
tion number of score being 0 and the all interaction number, respectively, of reader Ri in time
window tk.
Fig 7 expresses the details of VIP scheme. The proposed method can track the authorization
use of reader by checking the interaction proof. The method avoids the impact of reader distri-
bution and limited communication distance between readers and tags.
The trust computing process of VIP scheme is summarized as four steps: 1) The authentica-
tion center pre-authorizes reader Ri to interact with the tag Ti; 2) The interaction feedback
record at time t is saved in the tags; 3) At the time of next interaction, the tag Ti interacts with
the reader Rj.The interaction feedback record at time t is added into the data packet and trans-
mitted to the authentication center of reader Rj; 4) If the feedback score is 0, the authentication
Fig 6. Ample of time window mechanism in VIP scheme.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g006
A multi-domain trust management model
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center of Rj will send the abnormal event report to authentication center of Ri and administra-
tion center, respectively.
Main advantages of the proposed method based on verification of interaction proof are:
1. The authentication center tracks the authorization use of a reader by checking the interac-
tion feedback record.
2. The tag saves the interaction feedback record at time t. At the next time t’, the interaction
feedback record at time t is added into the data packet, and then tag deletes the record in its
own memory. Only saving the recent interaction feedback record is suitable for limited
built-in memory tag.
3. Intermediate readers will verify the integrity of data packet by checking h and h’. As a result,
the proposed method guarantees the route security during the process of transmitting the
data packet.
4. The proposed method can effectively prevent the tampering, replaying or forging attacks by
checking h, adding random number and time stamp in the data packet.
Trust management of authentication centers
The number of authentication centers is few, and their status is stable in a multi-domain RFID
system. Therefore, a centralized trust evaluation scheme is proposed to evaluate the trustwor-
thiness of authentication centers. An administration center is in charge of managing the trust
of authentication center based on the abnormal event reports of readers of its own domain.
The authentication center needs to collect the abnormal events of readers of its own domain
periodically, and sends the abnormal event reports to administration center. The abnormal
events can be found based on D-S scheme or VIP scheme. The administration center receives
the abnormal event reports and computes the trust of authentication center, as shown in Fig 8.
Let A and B denote two different domains. CA and CB denote their authentication center,
respectively. A tag Ti belongs to the domain A. Before a reader Ri interacts with a tag Ti, Ri
need to be authorized by the authentication center CA of tag Ti. Ri sends the authorization
request to CA. If Ri and Ti is in the same domain A, CA computes the trust of Ri as follows:
T intra
i
ðRiÞ ¼ T
gl
i
ðtkÞ ð10Þ
where T intra
i
ðRiÞ is intra-domain trust, which can be obtained with Eq(9) or Eq(8).
Fig 7. The realization process of VIP scheme.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g007
A multi-domain trust management model
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If Ri and Tk isn’t in the same domain A. Ri belongs to the domain B. CA computes the trust
of Ri as follows:
Tcrossi ðRiÞ ¼ bT
intra
i
ðRiÞ þ ð1   bÞT
inter
B
ðCBÞ ð11Þ
where Tcrossi ðRiÞ is cross-domain trust. T
inter
B
ðCBÞ is inter-domain trust, which is the trust of
authentication center CB of Ri. T interB ðCBÞ is computed by the administration center, as shown
in Fig 8. β is weighting factor.
If reader Ri is malicious node or malfunctioning node, the authorization is refused, other-
wise approved. When an abnormal event of Ri is found, the authentication center CA will
consider the behavior status of Ri as malicious reader or malfunctioning node, and send the
abnormal event report to administration center. Then, the trust of authentication center of CB
is changed by the administration center.
Experimental study
In this section, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed trust management, a series
of test scenarios are developed. Experiments were run using the ns3 simulator [26] on which
the creation of trust patterns, behaviors and interactions model was easier than with other net-
work simulators. Fig 9 shows the network topology, where red, green and pink points express
RFID readers, RFID tags and authentication centers respectively.
We assume that 100 readers are distributed at the area of three domains (CA, CB and CD)
whose size is 1500m x 1000m2. Each reader is located at a random position. Communication
range of a reader and a tag is 200m and 70m. Here, we simulate active tags which have a wide
transmission range of more than 70m [27]. The total simulation time is 260s. Firstly, trust eval-
uation accuracy is examined by comparing our schemes with other scheme [28]. In addition,
we also study the effect of mobility and communication range of tag on detection rate of mali-
cious event. Table 2 expresses the default simulations parameters.
Accuracy of trust evaluation
Trust evaluation accuracy plays an important role of evaluation the performance of the trust
scheme. In the section, we examine trust evaluation accuracy of D-S scheme and VIP scheme,
and make comparisons with Bayes-based scheme [28].
In the first group of experiment, 100 readers are distributed in the area of three domains
(CA, CB and CD) whose size is 900m x 600m2. Other parameters are default parameters. We
vary fraction (PM) of malicious readers who discards data packet from as low as 10% to as high
as 50%. A reader selected to be in this “malicious” population is benign initially, but turns
Fig 8. Computing the trust of authentication center.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g008
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malicious after a period of time t2[0, 120s] randomly generated is elapsed. The initial trust
value of authentication center CA is 0.9. In the experiment, D-S scheme is used to evaluate the
trust of CA. In our trust management framework, the trustworthiness of authentication center
is evaluated by administration center. Based on trust evaluation algorithm in the system model
section, the trust of authentication center is evaluated by collecting the abnormal event reports.
The trust evaluation results are shown in Fig 10.
We can see that there are four malicious events at 50s, which are found by neighbor nodes
at 60s, and six malicious event reports are sent to administration center. A malicious event
may be detected by multi-neighbors, so there are multi-reports. Once administration center
Fig 9. Network topology in the simulation experiments.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g009
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receives the malicious event reports, the trust value of CA is immediately updated. As the report
number of malicious events increases, the trust value of CA drops quickly. We see that after the
behavior status changes, our trust scheme quickly converges towards the new trust value. The
reason is that using more malicious event reports helps trust convergence more quickly.
Therefore our scheme can deal with large scale RFID applications.
In the second group of experiment, we compare our schemes with Bayes-based scheme.
The trust of CA is respectively evaluated three times by VIP scheme, D-S scheme and Bayes-
based scheme. The number of readers is respectively 50, 70 and 90 every time. The fraction
(PM) of malicious readers is 20%. A reader selected to be in this “malicious” population turns
malicious after a period of time t2[0, 120s]. Other parameters are default parameters. The
results are shown in Fig 11 and Fig 12.
We can see that the trust value of CA is changeless in the first and second time experiment
of D-S scheme. But the trust value decreases in the third time experiment of D-S scheme. The
reason is that the sparse distributed readers lead to the low malicious event detection rate.
Because the number of readers is less than 90, the malicious events aren’t be detected by neigh-
bor nodes. The trust evaluation results of D-S scheme and VIP scheme are similar. VIP scheme
outperforms all other mechanisms, which detects earlier the node misbehavior and decreases
the trust level of CA. Even if the number of readers is 50, the malicious events can also be
detected by VIP scheme. D-S scheme and Bayes-based scheme adjust the trust value of CA
based on observing the communication behavior of readers. But, the behaviors sometimes
may not be detected due to the limited communication range in RFID systems.
Fig 12 shows the results of malicious event detection rate. In the figure, the number of read-
ers is 90. From Fig 12, we can see that as the time increases, the malicious behavior detection
rate also rises. When time = 80s, the detection rate of VIP scheme reaches to the best value.
When time = 160s, the detection rate of D-S and Bayes-based scheme reaches to the best value.
The detection rate of malicious events in Bayes-based scheme is the lowest.
Effect of mobility of tag
A tag is typically attached to an object that may roam to other administrative domains. The
mobility of tag plays an important role when designing trust management mechanisms and
protocols. Since the tag moves from one domain to another domain, the network topology
also keeps continuously changing. These changes will have effect on detecting the malicious
Table 2. Default simulations parameters.
Number of readers 100
Number of tags 20
Communicating Range of a reader (m) 200
Communicating Range of a tag (m) 70
Simulation time (s) 260
Trust threshold W1, W2 and π1 0.7, 0.5, 0.5
Simulation Area (m2) 1500m x 1000m2
Communication Protocol 802.11
Not replaying or forging data (orders), but network transmission error malfunctioning
Intentionally replaying or forging data (orders) malicious
Maximum Speed (m/s) 70
Number of Malicious nodes 0%-50% of all nodes
Type of malicious event Discarding data packet
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.t002
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events. In the section we evaluate the effect of mobility of tag on detecting malicious event.
Our experiments are divided into two groups. In the process of experiment, we use D-S
scheme to evaluate the trustworthiness of reader. The fraction (PM) of malicious readers is
20%. The communication range of tag is 70m. In the two groups of experiments, the tags are
moving continuously at 15m/sec and 70m/sec, respectively. Other parameters are default
parameters. Fig 13(A)–13(D) shows the simulation results.
Fig 10. The convergence speed of D-S scheme. (a) Event result (Speed = 40m/s) (b) Trust result
(Speed = 40m/s).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g010
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In the Fig 13, the square mark, triangle mark and circle mark respectively indicates the
malicious event, detected malicious event and the trust value of CA. From Fig 13, one can see
that as the moving speed of tags increases, the occurrence rate of malicious events visibly
decreases, but the detection rate of malicious events becomes higher. Faster moving of tags
leads to the shorter interaction time with readers. Thus, the average number of malicious
events decreases. One can see that the average number of malicious events is respectively 120
and 40 in Fig 13(A) and Fig 13(C).
Fig 11. Comparation of convergence speed.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g011
Fig 12. Comparation of malicious event detection rate.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g012
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Fig 13. Effect of mobility of tag on detection rate of malicious event. (a) Event result (Speed = 15m/s) (b)
Trust result (Speed = 15m/s) (c) Event result (Speed = 70m/s) (d) Trust result (Speed = 70m/s).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g013
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Effect of communication range of tag
In the section, we evaluate the effect of communication range of tag on detection rate of mali-
cious event. We assume that the communication range of tag is dtag. The experiment is simu-
lated three times. Communication range of tag is set to 30m, 60m and 90m respectively. The
fraction (PM) of malicious readers is varied from 10% to as 50%. We use D-S scheme to evalu-
ate the trustworthiness of reader. Other parameters are default parameters. The Fig 14 shows
the trust evaluation result of the authentication center CA.
We can see that the trust value of CA hasn’t any changes in the first experiment (dtag =
30m). As the malicious events increase in the second experiment (dtag = 60m), the trust value
of CA starts to decrease. After a while, no new malicious event is detected, and then the trust
value of CA gradually increases. In the third experiment (dtag = 90m), the trust value of CA
quickly drops to the lowest value and remain steady.
As shown in Fig 14, the trust evaluation results of CA are different in three experiments.
The main reason is analyzed in the following:
The number of readers is n. The network area of readers is S. N is the average number of
readers met by a tag.
N ¼
d2
tag
 p n
S
ð12Þ
When the communication range is 30m, N ¼ 0:29. Thus, the interaction is difficult to be
detected by other readers in the first experiment. As a result, the performance of D-S scheme is
far from satisfied, if the communication range of tag is too short.
Conclusions and future
In the multi-domain RFID paradigm, a mobile tag will potentially interact with numerous
readers from different management domains for a coalition, as well as leverage available
Fig 14. Effect of communication range of tag on detection rate of malicious event.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181124.g014
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(foreign) infrastructure for information access while on the move. However, trust establish-
ment among entities from heterogeneous domains without past interaction or prior agreed
policy, is a challenge. Based on the specific requirements in multi-domain RFID systems,
this paper focuses on the critical trust management issues and proposes a multi-domain trust
management model. The proposed trust management model provides a hierarchical trust
management framework include a diversity of trust evaluation and establishment approaches.
We refer to two layers of trust in the framework: RFID reader trust layer and authentication
center trust layer. In RFID reader trust layer: We propose two kinds of scheme to evaluate
the trust of readers: D-S evidence theory based scheme (D-S scheme) and verification of inter-
action proof based scheme (VIP scheme). In authentication center trust layer: An administra-
tion center is used to manage the trustworthiness of authentication centers in a centralized
way. In the experiment section, we compare our schemes with Bayes-based scheme. The simu-
lation results and analysis show that VIP scheme outperforms all other mechanisms, which
detects earlier the node misbehavior. The detection rate of malicious events in Bayes-based
scheme is the lowest. In addition, the performance of D-S scheme is far from satisfied, if the
communication range of tag is too short. The malicious behaviors in D-S scheme and Bayes-
based scheme sometimes may not be detected due to the limited communication range in
RFID systems.
There are a few directions for our future work. In future work, the value of ϑ1, ϑ2 and π1 will
be studied in the algorithm simulation. We plan to develop a full list of threats against the pro-
posed hierarchical trust management framework and analyze the vulnerability of the system to
these threats. Performance optimization of the trust management system is another focus of
our future research work.
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